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THE HEALTH CARE CHOICE ACT: THE 
INDIVIDUAL INSURANCE MARKET AND THE 
POLITICS OF “CHOICE” 
ELIZABETH A. PENDO*
INTRODUCTION 
Our health care system is in crisis.  Although we spent nearly $1.9 
trillion on health care in 2004,1 a figure expected to rise to $3.1 trillion 
by 2012,2 this appears to be the result of higher prices, rather than in-
creased access to or usage of health care.3  At the same time, health in-
surance is increasingly hard to get, keep, and afford.  As a result, a grow-
ing number of Americans are uninsured—46 million people in 2004, an 
increase of 6 million since 2000.4
Traditionally, employer-sponsored group insurance plans have been 
the backbone of health insurance coverage in the United States.  While it 
is still true that most Americans get their health insurance through em-
* Copyright © 2006-07.  Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law; B.A. 
1990, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D. 1993, Boalt Hall School of Law, University 
of California, Berkeley.  Thank you to Nicolas Johnson and Robert Kerr for excellent research 
assistance, and to Kathy Cerminara for her thoughtful comments. 
1. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., TRENDS AND INDICATORS IN THE 
CHANGING HEALTH CARE MARKETPLACE, available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/7031 
(follow the “Section 1” hyperlink) [hereinafter TRENDS AND INDICATORS] (last visited Mar. 
22, 2007) (“Expenditures in the United States on health care were nearly $1.9 trillion in 2004, 
more than two and a half times the $717 billion spent in 1990, and more than seven times the 
$255 billion spent in 1980.”). 
2. Stephen Heffler et al., Health Spending Projections for 2002-2012, HEALTH AFF., 
Feb. 7, 2003, at W3-54, W3-54, available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.54v1.pdf. 
3. Gerard Anderson et al., It’s the Prices, Stupid: Why the United States is So Different 
from Other Countries, HEALTH AFF., May-June 2003, at 89, 90, available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/22/3/89.  According to testimony before the Senate, 
“we pay higher prices for the same services, have higher administrative costs, and perform 
more complex specialized procedures” than other countries.  KAREN DAVIS & BARBARA S. 
COOPER, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, AMERICAN HEALTH CARE: WHY SO COSTLY? 3 
(2003), available at http://www.cmwf.org/usr_doc/davis_senatecommitteetestimony_654.pdf. 
4. SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, GAPS IN HEALTH 
INSURANCE: AN ALL-AMERICAN PROBLEM 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.cmwf.org/usr_doc/collins_gapshltins_920.pdf. 
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ployment,5 the erosion of employer-sponsored coverage has increased 
the ranks of the uninsured.6  It has also pushed more workers, retirees, 
and their families into the individual insurance market—a small but im-
portant part of the broader health insurance market. 
Despite its relatively small size—9.1 percent of the population, or 
nearly 27 million people, turned to individual policies for health insur-
ance coverage in 20057—the individual market is increasingly impor-
tant.8  States have been active in regulating the individual market, and 
there now appears to be increased federal interest in connection with 
proposed tax credits for the purchase of individual health insurance.9  
5. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND 
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2004, at 16 (2005), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p60-229.pdf (“The percentage of people covered by 
employment-based health insurance decreased to 59.8 percent in 2004, from 60.4 percent in 
2003.”); see also KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, THE HENRY J. KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND., HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN AMERICA: 2004 DATA UPDATE 10 fig.2 
(2005), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/health-coverage-in-america-2004-
data-update-report.pdf [hereinafter 2004 DATA UPDATE] (61 percent of nonelderly covered by 
employer-sponsored health insurance); GARY CLAXTON ET AL., THE HENRY J. KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RES. & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY: 
2005 ANNUAL SURVEY 39-49 (2005), available at 
http://www.kff.org/insurance/7315/upload/7315.pdf (60 percent of nonelderly covered by em-
ployer-sponsored health insurance in 2005). 
6. For an overview of the uninsured and access to care, see Elizabeth A. Pendo, Images 
of Health Insurance in Popular Film: The Dissolving Critique, 37 J. HEALTH L. 267, 284-87 
(2004) [hereinafter Pendo, Images of Health Insurance in Popular Film]. 
7. U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Health Insurance Tables, Table HI-1: Health Insur-
ance Coverage Status and Type of Coverage by Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin, 1987 to 2005, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/historic/hihistt1.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2007); 
see also DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 5, at 19 fig.6 (stating that in 2004, 9.3 percent of 
the population had individual coverage; in 2003, 9.2 percent); 2004 DATA UPDATE, supra note 
5, at tbl.1 (stating that in 2004, 5.4 percent of the population under age 65, or nearly 14 mil-
lion people, had individual coverage); BETH C. FUCHS, THE ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON 
FOUND., HEALTH POLICY ALTERNATIVES, INC., EXPANDING THE INDIVIDUAL HEALTH 
INSURANCE MARKET: LESSONS FROM THE STATE REFORMS OF THE 1990S, at 3, 18 n.4 
(2004), available at 
http://www.rwjf.org/publications/synthesis/reports_and_briefs/pdf/no4_synthesisreport.pdf 
(stating that in 2002, only about 7 percent of Americans under the age of 65, or approximately 
17 million people, had individual health insurance coverage). 
8. Jon Gabel et al., Individual Insurance: How Much Financial Protection Does it Pro-
vide?, HEALTH AFF., Apr. 17, 2002, at W172 [hereinafter Gabel et al., Individual Insurance], 
available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.172v1.pdf (quoting Deborah 
L. Rogal & Anne K. Gauthier, The Evolution of the Individual Insurance Market, 25 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 3 (2000)) (“The long-term decline of employer-based insurance has 
thrust individual insurance, long viewed by the insurance industry as the ‘residual market’ 
onto center stage.”). 
9. See, e.g., FUCHS, supra note 7 (examining state reforms of the insurance market); 
Press Release, The White House, Making Health Care More Affordable and Accessible for 
All Americans (May 1, 2006), available at 
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Unfortunately, this market has not worked well for consumers, because 
individual policies usually cost more and cover less than those obtained 
through an employer, and even those consumers who can afford it may 
not have access. 
The Health Care Choice Act of 2005 (HCCA)10 aims to reform per-
ceived problems in the individual market, and is touted as part of the so-
lution to the problem of the uninsured.  It purports to allow individuals 
who are not eligible for or cannot afford group coverage to purchase an 
individual policy in and from any state.  If passed, the HCCA would al-
low health insurers to offer individual policies of insurance from any 
state without being required to comply with the laws of the insured’s 
own state.  Its proponents claim that it would lower the cost of individual 
health insurance by bypassing state laws such as those mandating bene-
fits, and offer consumers more choice. 
The HCCA has not received a lot of attention, perhaps because it 
was overshadowed by another bill, the Health Insurance Marketplace 
Modernization and Affordability Act (Enzi Bill), aimed at the small-
group market.11  But the HCCA is worth examining because it repre-
sents a bad choice for the individual market.  It does not appear that the 
HCCA would lower costs for most purchasers, increase meaningful 
choices, or reduce the overall number of uninsured.  Moreover, the 
HCCA would permit health insurers to sell policies from the states with 
the fewest consumer protections, and to market and sell those policies to 
consumers in all other states.  This would erode important consumer pro-
tections under state law and undercut the role of the states in regulating 
health insurance products and protecting their citizens. 
Worse, the HCCA could increase the existing problem of fragmen-
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060501-8.html [hereinafter “Making 
Health Care More Affordable and Accessible for All Americans”] (outlining President George 
W. Bush’s health care agenda, including a refundable tax credit to help low-income Ameri-
cans purchase health coverage on the individual market).  The Journal of Health Politics, Pol-
icy and Law also devoted an entire issue to policy initiatives in the individual market.  25 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 3 (2000). 
10. The Health Care Choice Act of 2005, H.R. 2355, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 1015, 
109th Cong. (2005). 
11. Health Insurance Marketplace Modernization and Affordability Act (Enzi Bill), S. 
1955, 109th Cong. (2005).  The Enzi Bill, named in recognition of its sponsor, Senator Mi-
chael Enzi, would have permitted small businesses and trade association to join together to 
form association health plans across state lines, and to offer coverage in a state without com-
plying with its mandated benefit laws.  152 CONG. REC. S4459 (daily ed. May 11, 2006) 
(statement of Sen. Enzi).  The bill was effectively blocked in the Senate on May 11, 2006, by 
a failure of a motion to close debate.  U.S. Senate, U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 109th Con-
gress—2nd Session (reporting that the cloture motion was rejected on S. 1955); 152 CONG. 
REC. S4459-60 (daily ed. May 11, 2006). 
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tation in the individual and broader insurance markets and divert atten-
tion away from systemic issues such as the increasingly high cost of 
health care, and the growing crisis of un- and under-insurance.  Indeed, 
the HCCA can be seen as an example of the larger political approach to 
health care policy, one focused on individual, market-based solutions 
that undermine the concept of health insurance as an expression of social 
solidarity and collective responsibility. 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE INDIVIDUAL INSURANCE MARKET 
Although the individual market covers a relatively small percentage 
of the population, it provides a critical source of coverage for people 
without access to group coverage.  As noted by one author, 
Anyone can find himself or herself in need of individual insurance.  
Common circumstances that lead people to seek coverage in the in-
dividual market include “aging off” a parent’s coverage, getting a 
job without health benefits, self-employment, working part time or 
taking extended leave, becoming divorced or widowed, and retiring 
before the age of 65, when Medicare coverage begins.  Thus, people 
who are used to having employment-based or public coverage may 
still need individual health insurance at some point during their life-
time.12
The role of the individual market as a “safety net” for those without 
access to a group policy on a short- or long-term basis may become even 
more important as employer-based health coverage continues to erode, 
and the number of uninsured continues to rise.13  Unfortunately, the in-
dividual insurance market has not worked well for consumers. 
A. Cost 
Individual policies usually cost more and cover less than those ob-
tained through an employer.14  Unlike employer-based coverage, in 
12. KAREN POLLITZ ET AL., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HOW ACCESSIBLE 
IS INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE FOR CONSUMERS IN LESS-THAN-PERFECT HEALTH? 1 
(2001), available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/20010620a-index.cfm (follow the “Report” 
hyperlink).  Workers who have exhausted their eligibility for continuation health insurance 
coverage under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), 
Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986), may also find themselves in the individual market.  
See generally LISA DUCHON ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, SECURITY MATTERS: HOW 
INSTABILITY IN HEALTH INSURANCE PUTS U.S. WORKERS AT RISK 24-25 (2001), available at 
http://www.cmwf.org/usr_doc/duchon_securitymatters_512.pdf. 
13. Gabel et al., Individual Insurance, supra note 8, at W172 (“The long-term decline 
of employer-based insurance has thrust individual insurance, long viewed by the insurance 
industry as the ‘residual market’ onto center stage.”). 
14. See, e.g., id. at W176, W177, W178 exhibit 3 (comparing the costs and available 
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many states the health and claims history of applicants for individual 
policies may be examined prior to an offer of coverage, and premiums 
may vary according to the applicant’s health status, age, and sex.15  
Moreover, in an unregulated market, there are generally no limits on the 
premiums the insurer can charge.16  Although reliable data is difficult to 
find,17 according to a 2004 survey of policies actually purchased, the av-
erage annual premium for an individual policy was $2,268 for an indi-
vidual, and $4,424 for a family.18  Other studies have looked at a smaller 
number of purchases, or at premiums offered but not adjusted for medi-
cal underwriting.  For example, a 2001 study by eHealthInsurance re-
ported annual premiums averaging $1,200 to $1,500 for individual poli-
cies,19 and a 2002 study by the Health Insurance Association of America 
reported average single premiums of $2,070 and family premiums of 
$4,009.20  These figures reflect the first premium offered or accepted, 
benefits of individual and group health insurance plans). 
15. See id. at W173 (describing the process of medical underwriting); POLLITZ ET AL., 
supra note 12, at 1 (describing a study that constructed seven hypothetical applicants and 
asked nineteen insurance companies and managed care organizations in eight markets how 
they would respond to an application for coverage); NANCY C. TURNBULL & NANCY M. 
KANE, HARVARD SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, INSURING THE HEALTHY OR INSURING THE SICK? 
THE DILEMMA OF REGULATING THE INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET 17 fig.3 
(2005), available at 
http://www.cmwf.org/usr_doc/771_turnbull_insuring_healthy_or_sick_findings.pdf (compari-
son of predicted premiums by family characteristics). 
16. Federal law does not regulate premium rates in the individual market.  See DENISE 
HARRIS & KATHLEEN STOLL, FAMILIES USA, PROTECTING CONSUMERS FROM UNFAIR RATE 
HIKES: THE NEED FOR REGULATION OF HEALTH INSURANCE RENEWAL PREMIUM INCREASES 
7 n.1 (2003), available at 
http://www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/Rate_Hikes_Revised_Feb_2003ca7a.pdf. 
17. See FUCHS, supra note 7, at 3 (noting that reliable premium comparisons are diffi-
cult because advertised premiums do not reflect increases due to medical underwriting; pre-
miums vary according to factors such as age, sex, health status, and state; policies are not 
standardized; and premiums may be higher upon renewal). 
18. THOMAS F. WILDSMITH, CTR. FOR POL’Y & RESEARCH, AM. HEALTH INS. PLANS, 
INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE: A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF AFFORDABILITY, ACCESS, 
AND BENEFITS 5 tbl.1 (2005), available at 
http://www.ahipresearch.org/pdfs/individual_insurance_survey_report8-26-2005.pdf (discuss-
ing a survey based on actual purchases of “just under 1.9 million policies, covering approxi-
mately 3.2 million [people]”).  The survey is “the most extensive industry survey of individual 
coverage undertaken to date.”  Id. at 1. 
19. VIP PATEL, EHEALTHINSURANCE, ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL SALES DATA OF 
INDIVIDUAL AND FAMILY HEALTH INSURANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS AND THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF HEALTH INSURANCE TAX CREDITS 2 (2001), available at 
http://www.ehealthinsurance.com/ehealthinsurance/eHealth2.pdf (discussing survey based on 
20,000 actual sales by eHealthInsurance). 
20. THOMAS D. MUSCO, HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., HIAA SURVEY: INDIVIDUAL 
MEDICAL EXPENSE INSURANCE: AFFORDABLE, SERVES YOUNG AND OLD 1 tbl.1 (2002), 
available at http://www.ahipresearch.org/PDFs/19_HIAAIndividualMarketPremiums.pdf. 
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not the actual or entire cost of individual coverage.  For example, once 
the policy has been issued, rates can generally be increased upon re-
newal.21  In addition, cost sharing features such as deductibles and co-
insurance are often higher with individual plans,22 and premiums paid 
for individual coverage do not receive the same preferential tax treat-
ment as employer-sponsored plans.23
Although premiums for individual coverage can vary widely, it is 
clear that cost is a major barrier to the individual market.  The majority 
of uninsured adults reported cost as the reason they lacked coverage.24  
The majority of people who have considered purchasing an individual 
health plan in recent years have found it unaffordable, and only a minor-
ity of those who looked into an individual policy ended up purchasing 
coverage.25
B. Access 
Even those who can afford individual coverage may not have ac-
cess.  In most states, health insurers offering individual policies have no 
legal obligation to offer or provide coverage.26  In an unregulated mar-
ket, insurers can exclude from or impose waiting periods for coverage of 
21. In general, federal law does not regulate premium rates in the individual market.  
See HARRIS & STOLL, supra note 16, at 3.  Although the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
cessibility Act (HIPAA) provides that an individual leaving group coverage can purchase an 
individual policy that is guaranteed to be renewable, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-41 to -42 (2006), it 
does not limit the premium that the offering insurer may charge, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-41(f)(1).  
In 2002, a federal bill was introduced that would limit the practice of medical re-underwriting 
as a basis for increasing premiums for an individual insured at the time of renewal, but to date, 
it has not passed.  Health Insurance Fairness Act, S. 3119, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 5682, 
107th Cong. (2002). 
22. See, e.g., Gabel et al., Individual Insurance, supra note 8, at 176-77. 
23. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFF., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST 
ESTIMATE, H.R. 2355 HEALTH CARE CHOICE ACT OF 2005, at 5 (2005) [hereinafter CBO 
COST ESTIMATE] (as ordered reported by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce on 
July 20, 2005), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6639/hr2355.pdf.  For an 
overview of the tax treatment of health care plans, see Amy B. Monahan, The Promise and 
Peril of Ownership Society Health Care Policy, 80 TUL. L. REV. 777, 782-86 (2006). 
24. JOHN A. GRAVES & SHARON K. LONG, THE URBAN INST., WHY DO PEOPLE LACK 
HEALTH INSURANCE? 4 fig.1 (2006), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411317_lack_health_ins.pdf (54 percent of uninsured 
adults under age 65 reported high cost as the reason they were uninsured). 
25. DUCHON ET AL., supra note 12, at 24-25. 
26. HIPAA provides the right to buy an individual policy for individuals leaving group 
coverage, and in the small group market, but federal law does not ensure access for those pre-
viously uninsured or covered by a different individual policy.  See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-42.  
Only a few states have enacted guaranteed issue laws that ensure the right of people to pur-
chase in the individual market.  See FUCHS, supra note 7, at 7 fig.6 (stating that, as of 2000, 
twelve states had enacted guaranteed issue laws). 
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applicants with pre-existing conditions.27  For example, a study by the 
Kaiser Family Foundation looking at seven applicants of varying age, 
gender, and life circumstances and with seven different pre-existing 
conditions—including hay fever, a surgically repaired knee, asthma and 
recurrent ear infections, breast cancer, depression, high blood pressure, 
and HIV+ status—found that overall the applicants were rejected 37 
percent of the time.28  When offers of coverage were made, only 10 per-
cent of the offers were at the standard rate, and most contained benefit 
restrictions, surcharges, or both.29  In an unregulated market, individuals 
in less-than-perfect health may be offered coverage at prohibitively high 
rates or denied coverage altogether.30
C.  Adequacy 
The quality or adequacy of coverage available on the individual 
market is also an issue.  Individual policies usually cover less than those 
obtained through an employer.  For instance, individual policies typi-
cally offer lower levels of reimbursement.  One study reported that indi-
vidual insurance covers, on average, 63 percent of medical bills, while 
group insurance covers 75 percent.31  Consumers also may have a diffi-
cult time finding coverage for what many consider to be basic benefits, 
such as “maternity benefits, mental health care, and prescription medica-
tions [which] tends to be limited, especially in comparison to what is 
typically offered under group health plans.”32  As stated above, in the 
absence of state regulation, insurers can also exclude coverage of pre-
existing conditions and impose significant waiting periods. 
27. See FUCHS, supra note 7, at 7 fig.6 (stating that, as of 2000, thirty-one states had 
enacted laws limiting exclusions for pre-existing conditions). 
28. POLLITZ ET AL., supra note 12, at ii, 17 chart 6, 20. 
29. Id. at 20.  The average annual premium offered was $3,996, a significant increase 
from the standard average annual rate of $2,988.  Id. at 21. 
30. See ALLIANCE FOR HEALTH REFORM, HEALTH CARE COVERAGE IN AMERICA: 
UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 10 (2006), available at 
http://www.allhealth.org/publications/pub_7.pdf.  HIPAA prohibits insurers from excluding or 
medically underwriting individuals in group health plans, but offers no such protection for 
individuals seeking individual policies.  See id. 
31. Gabel et al., Individual Insurance, supra note 8, at W172. 
32. POLLITZ ET AL., supra note 12, at 31; see SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., 
COMMONWEALTH FUND, PAYING MORE FOR LESS: OLDER ADULTS IN THE INDIVIDUAL 
INSURANCE MARKET 1-2 (2005) (citations omitted), available at 
http://www.cmwf.org/usr_doc/841_Collins_older_adults_ib.pdf (“[A]dults ages 50 to 70 who 
rely on individual market insurance pay much higher premiums than their counterparts with 
employer coverage or Medicare. . . .  Yet, . . . older adults with individual coverage . . . have 
far less comprehensive coverage and are more likely to face insurance restrictions and admin-
istrative complications,” poorer access to care, and higher out-of-pocket expenses.). 
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It is well known that less comprehensive health plans can subject 
people to tremendous health and financial risks.33  According to one 
study, “[over half] the underinsured (54%) and uninsured (59%) went 
without at least one of four needed medical services—double the rate of 
those with adequate insurance.”34  Moreover, “rates of medical bill 
stress among the underinsured were equal to those reported by the unin-
sured.”35  It is not surprising, then, that people with individual policies 
are less likely to say that they feel “well protected” by their insurance 
than people with group policies, and the majority of them are at least 
somewhat worried that their health plan will not pay for their health care 
needs.36
D.  State Regulation 
In response to problems such as these, states have used their tradi-
tional regulatory powers under the McCarran-Ferguson Act37 to enact 
various reforms to the individual market.  In general, these reforms at-
tempt to make coverage more accessible and affordable, and to spread 
risk across a large number of people.38  Common types of state regula-
tion include: guaranteed issue laws; guaranteed renewal laws; limitations 
of exclusions for pre-existing conditions; rating reforms aimed at limit-
ing the extent to which premiums can vary by age, sex, or health status, 
such as rating bands or community rating; and reforms designed to 
spread risk across insurers.39
33. See generally SHERRY GLIED ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, BARE-BONES 
HEALTH PLANS: ARE THEY WORTH THE MONEY? (2002), available at 
http://www.cmwf.org/usr_doc/glied_barebones_518.pdf; Laura Tollen & Robert M. Crane, A 
Temporary Fix? Implications of the Move Away from Comprehensive Health Benefits, EMP. 
BENEFIT RES. INST., Apr. 2002, at 1, available at 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/0402ib.pdf. 
34. Cathy Schoen et al., Commonwealth Fund, Insured but Not Protected: How Many 
Adults are Underinsured?, HEALTH AFF., June 14, 2005, at W5-289. 
35. Id.; see also FUCHS, supra note 7, at 4; ALLIANCE FOR HEALTH REFORM, supra 
note 30, at 5. 
36. Assessment of Current Plan, HEALTH POLL REPORT (The Henry J. Kaiser Family 
Found.), Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 4, available at 
http://www.kff.org/healthpollreport/Oct_2004/upload/healthpoll_oct04.pdf (“People who pur-
chase their own insurance are less likely to say they feel well protected by their insurance 
(43%) than people who are insured through their employers (58%).  Nearly six in ten (57%) 
self-purchasers are at least somewhat worried that their health plan will not pay for their 
health care needs (including 11% who say their insurance is inadequate and they feel very 
worried).”). 
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2000). 
38. FUCHS, supra note 7, at 7-9. 
39. See generally id. (defining and summarizing types of reforms); TURNBULL & KANE, 
supra note 15, at 2-3 (same).  For case studies of regulations in individual states, see Mark A. 
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Another key area of state regulation is aimed at the adequacy of 
coverage, addressed through mandated benefit laws that require insurers 
to offer or cover a specific provider, procedure, or benefit.40  For exam-
ple, Massachusetts law requires that all health insurance policies that 
provide coverage for pregnancy-related benefits must provide the same 
extent of “coverage for medically necessary expenses of diagnosis and 
treatment of infertility.”41  About one-third of the states have enacted 
some type of mandated benefit law requiring insurers to offer or to cover 
certain infertility treatments.42  According to the Kaiser Family Founda-
tion, “Over the last few years, an increasing number of states have en-
acted mandated benefits and consumer protection laws, and the scope of 
these laws has expanded.”43
State efforts to reform the individual market to increase access and 
affordability have met with mixed results.44  Many who turn to the indi-
vidual market for coverage still find themselves unable to get, keep, or 
afford coverage.  According to one survey, more than half of those 
polled said that it was “difficult or impossible to find a[n individual pol-
icy] to fit their health needs,” and two-thirds said that it was “difficult or 
Hall, An Evaluation of New York’s Reform Law, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 71 (2000); 
Mark A. Hall, An Evaluation of Vermont’s Reform Law, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 101 
(2000); Adele M. Kirk, Riding the Bull: Experience with Individual Market Reform in Wash-
ington, Kentucky and Massachusetts, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 133 (2000); Katherine 
Swartz & Deborah W. Garnick, Lessons from New Jersey, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 45 
(2000). 
40. There are a few federal mandates.  For example, ERISA has been amended to re-
quire that health care benefit plans include coverage for post-delivery hospital stays, 29 
U.S.C. § 1185(a) (2000), and to require coverage for certain post-mastectomy treatment and 
care, including reconstruction, 29 U.S.C. § 1185b(a). 
41. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 47H (2004).  The Massachusetts Health Care Reform 
plan currently includes all presently mandated benefits, although there is a moratorium on new 
mandated benefits until January 1, 2008, when the State will complete a study of the cost and 
necessity of existing mandates.  2006 Mass. Legis. Serv. 121 (West). 
42. A summary of state infertility insurance coverage laws can be found at the webpage 
of the National Conference of State Legislatures.  Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, 50 
State Summary of State Laws Related to Insurance Coverage for Infertility Therapy, 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/50infert.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2007).  Of course, 
employers may choose to include infertility treatment in their health plans absent a state man-
date.  See Mercer Health & Benefits, Employer Experience with, and Attitudes Toward, Cov-
erage of Infertility Treatment (May 31, 2006) (copy on file with author) (finding that of those 
surveyed, approximately 50 percent of employers covered evaluation of infertility, 37 percent 
covered drug therapies, and 20 percent covered “in vivo” or “in vitro” fertilization.  Moreover, 
more than two-thirds have been providing infertility coverage at their current level for more 
than five years). 
43. TRENDS AND INDICATORS, supra note 1, § 4 exhibit 4.12. 
44. See, e.g., FUCHS, supra note 7, at 9-14 (discussing findings based on a review of the 
literature); TURNBULL & KANE, supra note 15, at vi-viii (summarizing findings based on an 
assessment of reforms in seven states that adopted different approaches). 
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impossible to find an affordable” individual policy.45  As a result, less 
than one third of those who considered individual coverage actually pur-
chased a policy.46
II. PROPOSED SOLUTION:  THE HEALTH CARE CHOICE ACT 
The Health Care Choice Act of 2005 claims to address barriers to 
the individual market by increasing access and affordability.  Under cur-
rent law, health insurance is regulated by each state, so individuals must 
buy health insurance coverage in the state in which they live.47  If 
passed, the HCCA would allow health insurers to offer individual poli-
cies of insurance from any state without being required to comply with 
the laws of the insured’s home state. 
The insurer could file an individual heath insurance policy in a state 
of its choosing,48 the “primary state,” and then sell that coverage in other 
states, the “secondary states.”49  In general, the laws of the primary state 
would apply to individual health insurance coverage offered in the pri-
mary state or in any secondary state.50  Insurers would be exempt from 
laws in the secondary states such as guaranteed issue laws, guaranteed 
renewal laws, rating reforms, and, significantly, mandated benefit 
laws.51  However, insurers would not be exempt from laws of the secon-
dary states regarding taxes, registration, financial examination, compli-
ance with certain court orders, participation in high-risk pools, and 
fraud, abuse, and unfair claims practices.52
45. DUCHON ET AL., supra note 12, at 24; see also POLLITZ ET AL., supra note 12 (ex-
amining the application process of seven hypothetical consumers in the individual insurance 
market). 
46. DUCHON ET AL., supra note 12, at 24 (reporting that “[o]nly 28 percent purchased 
a[n individual health] plan”). 
47. Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, regulation of insurance is reserved to the indi-
vidual states.  15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2000) (“No Act of Congress shall be construed to invali-
date, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the busi-
ness of insurance . . . unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance.”). 
48. Health Care Choice Act of 2005, H.R. 2355, sec. 4(a), Pt. D., § 2795(1), 109th 
Cong. (2005).  There are certain minimum requirements: the primary state must use a risk-
based capital formula for solvency, and have an independent external review law or rules, 
unless the insurer’s independent review process is the functional equivalent of the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners’ model act.  H.R. 2355, sec. 4(a), Pt. D., § 2797. 
49. H.R. 2355, sec. 4(a), Pt. D., § 2796(a)(1) (defining “primary state” and “secondary 
state”).  Any coverage offered in a secondary state must also be offered in the insurer’s pri-
mary state.  H.R. 2355, sec. 4(a), Pt. D., § 2796(e). 
50. H.R. 2355, sec. 4(a), Pt. D., § 2796(a). 
51. H.R. 2355, sec. 4(a), Pt. D., § 2796(b).  The HCCA does prohibit the insurer from 
reclassifying an insured based on health-status factors at renewal, or increasing premiums 
based on health status or claims history.  H.R. 2355, sec. 4(a), Pt. D., § 2796(d). 
52. H.R. 2355, sec. 4(a), Pt. D., § 2796(b). 
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Accordingly, individuals would be free to purchase policies filed in 
states other than their own.  Policies and renewal policies sold in secon-
dary states would be required to include a “clear and conspicuous disclo-
sure” that the policy is governed by the law of the primary state.53  In-
surers would be permitted to change designation of the primary state 
upon renewal, but would be required to provide notice of such change to 
the insurance commissioners of the primary and secondary state.54
Finally, the primary state would have sole jurisdiction to enforce its 
applicable laws.55  The secondary state may enforce only those laws 
from which the insurer is exempt, and may notify the applicable authori-
ties of the primary state of any suspected violation of the primary state’s 
laws.56
III. A BAD CHOICE? 
The HCCA has received little attention, perhaps because the indi-
vidual insurance market is small, and because the HCCA was overshad-
53. H.R. 2355, sec. 4(a), Pt. D, § 2796(c).  Policies must provide the following notice: 
This policy is issued by ____ and is governed by the laws and relations of the State 
of ____, and it has met all the laws of that State as determined by that State’s De-
partment of Insurance.  This policy may be less expensive than others because it is 
not subject to all of the insurance laws and regulations of the State of ____, includ-
ing coverage of some services or benefits mandated by the law of the State of ____.  
Additionally, this policy is not subject to all of the consumer protection laws or re-
strictions on rate changes of the State of ____.  As with all insurance products, be-
fore purchasing this policy, you should carefully review the policy and determine 
what health care services the policy covers and what benefits it provides, including 
any exclusions, limitations, or conditions for such services or benefits. 
Id. 
54. H.R. 2355, sec. 4(a), Pt. D, § 2796(g).  Subsection (g) requires, inter alia: 
Each health insurance issuer issuing individual health insurance coverage in both 
primary and secondary States shall submit—(1) to the insurance commissioner of 
each State in which it intends to offer such coverage . . . a copy of the plan of opera-
tion or feasibility study . . . written notice of any change in its designation of its 
primary State; and . . . written notice from the issuer of the issuer’s compliance with 
all the laws of the primary State. 
Id. 
55. H.R. 2355, sec. 4(a), Pt. D, § 2798(a). 
56. H.R. 2355, sec. 4(a), Pt. D., § 2798(d).  Some opponents of the HCCA have raised 
concerns regarding the effectiveness of enforcement under this section.  See, e.g., FAMILIES 
USA, H.R. 2355: THE WRONG PRESCRIPTION FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE NEEDS 2 
(2006), available at http://www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/bad-ideas-shadegg-hr-2355.pdf.  
This is of concern in light of previous findings regarding fraud in the individual market.  See, 
e.g., Health Insurance Challenges: Buyer Beware: Hearing Before the S.  Comm. on Finance, 
108th Cong. 40 (2004) (statement of Robert J. Cramer, Managing Dir., Off. of Special Inves-
tigations, U.S. Gen. Accounting Off.) (“At least 15,000 employers purchased coverage from 
unauthorized entities, affecting more than 200,000 policyholders from 2000 through 2002.”).  
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owed by the Enzi Bill, which was aimed at the small-group market.57  
But it is worth examining because it represents a bad choice for the indi-
vidual market.  It does not appear that the HCCA would lower costs for 
most purchasers, increase meaningful choices, or reduce the overall 
number of uninsured.  Instead, it may further erode protections under 
state law, and undercut the role of the states in regulating health insur-
ance products and protecting their citizens. 
A.  Cost 
Supporters of the HCCA58 claim that the cost of individual health 
insurance would be lowered by offering consumers choices across state 
lines.  As explained by Senator Jim DeMint: 
Consumers can choose the policy that best suits their needs, and their 
budget, without regard to State boundaries.  Individuals looking for 
basic health insurance coverage can opt for a policy with few benefit 
mandates, and such a policy will be more affordable.  On the other 
hand, consumers who have an interest in a particular benefit, such as 
infertility treatments, will be able to purchase a policy which in-
57. Health Insurance Marketplace Modernization and Affordability Act of 2005 (Enzi), 
S. 1955, 109th Cong. (2005). 
58. Supporters of the HCCA include: Alliance for Affordable Services; Americans for 
Tax Reform; Chamber of Commerce of the United States; Council for Affordable Health In-
surance; eBay; Latino Coalition; The Maine Heritage Policy Center; National Association for 
the Self-Employed; National Association of Insurance Commissioners; National Center for 
Policy Analysis; National Federation of Independent Business; National Taxpayers Union; 
Small Business & Entrepreneurship Council; and Steve Forbes.  See, e.g., Letter from Angela 
M. Hunter, Council for Affordable Health Ins., Dir. of Fed. Affairs, to Rep. John Shadegg 
(May 12, 2005), available at http://www.cahi.org/cahi_contents/issues/HR2355supportltr.pdf; 
Letter from William Callaghan, President, Alliance for Affordable Servs., to Rep. John 
Shadegg (May 5, 2005) (on file with the author); Letter from Paul J. Gessing, Nat’l Tax Pay-
ers Union, Dir. of Gov’t Affairs, to Rep. John Shadegg (May 12, 2005), available at 
http://www.cahi.org/cahi_contents/issues/NTUltr05-11-05ShadeggHealthCare.pdf; Press Re-
lease, Me. Heritage Pol’y Ctr., Free-Market Health Insurance Reform Introduced to John 
Shadegg (May 12, 2005), available at 
http://www.cahi.org/cahi_contents/issues/MaineHeritagePolicyPR05.12.pdf; Letter from 
Grover G. Norquist, President, Am. for Tax Reform, to Sen. Jim DeMint (May 17, 2005) (on 
file with the author); Letter from Dan Danner, Executive Vice President, Public Pol’y & Pol., 
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., to Rep. John Shadegg (May 11, 2005), available at 
http://www.cahi.org/cahi_contents/issues/NFIBsupportltr05.pdf; Letter from Tod H. Cohen, 
Vice President, Global Gov’t Relations, eBay, to Rep. John Shadegg (May 10, 2005), avail-
able at http://www.cahi.org/cahi_contents/issues/latinocoalitionsupportltr05.pdf; Letter from 
Robert G. de Posada, President, Latino Coalition, to Rep. John Shadegg (May 10, 2005), 
available at http://www.cahi.org/cahi_contents/issues/latinocoalitionsupportltr05.pdf; Letter 
from Robert Hughes, President, Nat’l Assoc’n for the Self-Employed, to Rep. John Shadegg 
(June 20, 2005), available at 
http://www.cahi.org/cahi_contents/issues/NASEsupportltr0705.pdf. 
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cludes that benefit.59
The argument is that state laws, and mandated benefit laws in par-
ticular, make health insurance more expensive.60  For example, insur-
ance industry advocacy groups such as the Council for Affordable 
Health Insurance (CAHI)61 have stated that “in certain states, mandated 
benefits have increased the cost of individual health insurance by as 
much as 45%.”62  Another study, by the Cato Institute, claims that state 
mandated benefit laws have a net cost of $13.5 billion.63  Therefore, 
supporters of the HCCA argue, if consumers were able to purchase indi-
vidual health insurance policies from other states—presumably states 
with fewer mandated benefits and protections—their coverage would 
cost less. 
The claim that state mandated benefit laws dramatically increase 
the cost of individual coverage is “the traditional defense by the insur-
ance industry against coverage mandates of all sorts.”64  Although the 
impact of mandated coverage on health care premiums is an issue, the 
core assumption that state mandated benefit laws dramatically increase 
59. 151 CONG. REC. S5073 (daily ed. May 12, 2005) (statement of Sen. DeMint), 
available at http://www.senate.gov/~finance/hearings/testimony/2005test/040606jdtest.pdf. 
60. In the words of Senator DeMint, “The cost of insurance is often increased by exces-
sive State regulations.  These State mandates raise the cost of insurance which, in turn, in-
creases the number of Americans who are priced out of the health insurance market.”  Id.  
Conservative and industry advocacy groups also criticize guaranteed issue and community 
rating laws.  See, e.g., CONRAD F. MEIER, DESTROYING INSURANCE MARKETS: HOW 
GUARANTEED ISSUE AND COMMUNITY RATING DESTROYED THE INDIVIDUAL INSURANCE 
MARKET IN EIGHT STATES (2005), available at 
http://www.cahi.org/cahi_contents/resources/pdf/destroyinginsmrkts05.pdf.  The first finding 
in the text of the HCCA appears to adopt this argument: “The application of numerous and 
significant variations in State law impacts the ability of insurers to offer, and individuals to 
obtain, affordable health insurance coverage, thereby impeding commerce in individual health 
insurance coverage.”  H.R. 2355, sec. 3(1). 
61. According to its webpage, the Council for Affordable Health Insurance is “a non-
profit research and advocacy association whose mission is to develop and promote free market 
solutions to America’s health care challenges.”  Press Release, Council for Affordable Health 
Ins., CAHI Applauds Florida’s HSA for State Employees (Oct. 11, 2006), available at 
http://www.cahi.org/article.asp?id=697. 
62. COUNCIL FOR AFFORDABLE HEALTH INS., 2006 STATE LEGISLATORS’ GUIDE TO 
HEALTH INSURANCE SOLUTIONS 23-25 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 STATE LEGISLATORS’ 
GUIDE TO HEALTH INSURANCE SOLUTIONS], available at 
http://www.cahi.org/cahi_contents/resources/pdf/2006StateLeg.pdf (reporting that “as many 
as one in four individuals who are without coverage are uninsured because of the cost of state 
health benefits mandates”). 
63. Christopher J. Conover, Health Care Regulation: A $169 Billion Hidden Tax, 
CATO INST., Oct. 4, 2004, at 13, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa527.pdf. 
64. Adam Sonfield, Drive for Insurance Coverage of Infertility Treatment Raises Ques-
tions of Equity, Cost, THE GUTTMACHER REP., Oct. 1999, at 4, 5, available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/02/5/gr020504.pdf. 
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the cost of individual insurance bears close scrutiny.  Indeed, according 
to the report of the Congressional Budget Office generated in connection 
with the HCCA, “[even if] only those benefit mandates imposed by the 
states with the lowest-cost mandates were in effect in all states, the price 
of individual health insurance would be reduced by about 5 percent, on 
average.”65
Consider state mandates requiring coverage of infertility treatment, 
frequently singled out as an example of expensive and optional treat-
ment,66 including in the HCCA’s legislative history.67  Opponents of 
state laws mandating equitable coverage of infertility treatment, such as 
the law in Massachusetts, would argue that increased coverage of treat-
ments for infertility, in particular in vitro fertilization,68 would dramati-
cally increase the cost of coverage.  However, this argument is uncon-
vincing because there is evidence that the cost of including 
comprehensive coverage of infertility treatment is overstated.69  Past 
studies have reported estimated cost increases from $20 to $175 per 
year.70  One recent study of more than 900 employers found that 91 per-
cent of employers who provided infertility coverage for their employees 
did not experience an increase in their medical costs as a result of pro-
viding coverage for infertility treatment, including employers offering 
coverage of in vitro fertilization.71  Of course, cost data from the group 
65. CBO COST ESTIMATE, supra note 23, at 4. 
66. Sonfield, supra note 64, at 5 (stating that “‘infertility treatment is sometimes 
lumped together with cosmetic surgery as a life-style type procedure, rather than considered 
serious medicine’” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Deborah Wachenheim of 
RESOLVE)); see also Elizabeth A. Pendo, The Politics of Infertility: Recognizing Coverage 
Exclusions as Discrimination, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 293, 343 (2004) [hereinafter Pendo, The 
Politics of Infertility]. 
67. 151 CONG. REC. S5073 (daily ed. May 12, 2005) (statement of Sen. DeMint), 
available at http://www.senate.gov/~finance/hearings/testimony/2005test/040606jdtest.pdf. 
68. “In vitro” fertilization is a process in which the ova are removed from the woman’s 
body by laproscopy, fertilized with semen from her partner or a donor, incubated in a labora-
tory dish until an embryo develops, and then transferred to the woman’s uterus.  RESOLVE, 
RESOLVING INFERTILITY: UNDERSTANDING THE OPTIONS AND CHOOSING SOLUTIONS WHEN 
YOU WANT TO HAVE A BABY 176-77, 179-83 (Diane Aronson, ed., 1999). 
69. See Pendo, The Politics of Infertility, supra note 66, at 340-42 (discussing costs of 
comprehensive treatment of infertility). 
70. Jane Gross, The Fight to Cover Infertility: Suit Says Employer’s Refusal to Pay is 
Form of Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1998, at B1, available at 1998 WLNR 2965792 (Westlaw) 
(“A study in Massachusetts, based on actual experience, found that the additional cost of such 
coverage was $1.71 a month per member.  Other studies, based on projections, put the cost at 
about $3 a year.”); Shorge Sato, Note, A Little Bit Disabled: Infertility and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 189, 197-200 (2001) (stating that the Na-
tional Center for Policy Analysis “alleged a much higher premium increase . . . raising the 
cost of a policy from $105 to $175 per year”). 
71. There is also evidence that comprehensive coverage of infertility treatment could 
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market is not readily transferable to the individual market due to de-
creased risk pooling, but it does suggest that cost arguments against state 
mandates should be scrutinized. 
While evidence that the HCCA would significantly reduce the cost 
of individual policies overall is far from convincing, it does appear likely 
that allowing people to purchase less comprehensive policies across state 
lines would reduce the cost of such policies for some.  As noted by the 
Congressional Budget Office, the HCCA would “reduce the price of in-
dividual health insurance coverage for people expected to have relatively 
low health care costs, while increasing the price of coverage for those 
expected to have relatively high health care costs.”72  This creates the 
risk of adverse selection, a process by which people who have higher 
health care costs seek health insurance at a disproportionate rate to peo-
ple who have (or think they have) relatively lower health care costs.73  
Similarly, under the HCCA, individuals with relatively low health care 
costs could choose cheaper out-of-state policies, thus increasing the pro-
portion of people with higher health care costs and ultimately eroding 
the availability of more comprehensive coverage in the home state.  This 
causes the pool of people to lose its healthier members and costs to in-
crease, a process called the “death spiral.”74  Indeed, studies of state re-
forms suggest that if insurers organized in weaker-regulation states, as 
permitted under the HCCA, older and less-healthy consumers could have 
difficulty getting coverage.75
achieve cost savings, at least in the group market.  Sato, supra note 70, at 198-99; see also 
Pendo, The Politics of Infertility, supra note 66, at 342-43. 
72. CBO COST ESTIMATE, supra note 23, at 13. 
73. Professor Mary Crossley made a similar argument with respect to health savings 
accounts.  Mary Crossely, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 73, 136-37 (2005). 
74. See CLAUDIA H. WILLIAMS & BETH C. FUCHS, THE ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON 
FOUND., POLICY BRIEF NO. 4, at 2 (2004), available at 
http://www.rwjf.org/publications/synthesis/reports_and_briefs/pdf/no4_policybrief.pdf (dis-
cussing “adverse selection”); NANCY C. TURNBULL ET AL., INSURING THE HEALTHY OR 
INSURING THE SICK?  THE DILEMMA OF REGULATING THE INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE 
MARKET: SHORT CASE STUDIES OF SIX STATES 20 (2005), available at 
http://www.cmwf.org/usr_doc/790_turnbull_insuring_healthy_or_sick_case_studies.pdf (dis-
cussing “adverse selection spiral”). 
75. See TURNBULL & KANE, supra note 15, at vii (“In the four states with weaker regu-
lations a significant percentage of applicants—as many as 30 percent to 40 percent for some 
carriers—is rejected for coverage, leaving these people with no option except high-risk pools 
with very expensive premiums.”). 
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B. Access 
Opponents of the HCCA76 also note that without decreasing costs 
and increasing choice, it appears unlikely that the HCCA would signifi-
cantly reduce the number of uninsured.  Indeed, the Congressional 
Budget Office predicted that the HCCA would not lead to a significant 
net increase in the number of people with insurance,77 although there 
could be a shift of approximately one million people from employer-
sponsored coverage to the individual market.78  In light of the problems 
with individual coverage outlined above, simply shifting one million 
people from employer-sponsored coverage to the individual market not 
only fails to solve the problem, but also appears to make it worse.79
76. Opponents of the HCCA include: AFL-CIO; Alliance for Advancing Nonprofit 
Health Care; Alliance for Children & Families; American Academy of Child & Adolescent 
Psychiatry; American Academy of HIV Medicine; American Academy of Physician Assis-
tants; American Association for Geriatric Psychiatry; American Association for Marriage and 
Family Therapy; American Association of People with Disabilities; American Chiropractic 
Association; American College of Nurse-Midwives; American Counseling Association; 
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees; American Group Psycho-
therapy Association; American Nurses Association; American Occupational Therapy Associa-
tion; American Podiatric Medical Association; American Psychological Association; Ameri-
can Psychotherapy Association; American Society of Pediatric Nephrology; Anxiety 
Disorders Association of America; Association for the Advancement of Psychology; Associa-
tion of University Centers on Disabilities; Clinical Social Work Guild 49, OPEIU; Commis-
sion on Social Action of Reform Judaism; Committee of Ten Thousand; Communications 
Workers of America; Consumers Union; Delta Dental Plans Association; Depression and Bi-
polar Support Alliance; Eating Disorders Coalition for Research, Policy and Action; Family 
USA; Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights; HIP Health Plan of New York; Hemo-
philia Federation of America; International Brotherhood of Electric Workers; NAADAC, As-
sociation for Addiction Professionals; NETWORK, a National Catholic Social Justice Lobby; 
National Association of Anorexia Nervosa and Associated Disorders; National Association of 
Social Workers; National Council for Community Behavioral Healthcare; National Council of 
Jewish Women; National Disability Rights Network; National Health Law Program; National 
Hemophilia Foundation; National Mental Health Association; National Multiple Sclerosis 
Society; National Partnership for Women and Families; National Women’s Law Center; Pub-
lic Citizen; Service Employees International Union; Suicide Prevention Action Network USA; 
The Arc of the United States; U.S. PIRG; United Cerebral Palsy.  See Letter from Nat’l Part-
nership for Women & Families, to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House, U.S. H. of Reps. 
(June 20, 2006), available at http://www.aapd-dc.org/policies/so060622hr2355.htm. 
77.  CBO COST ESTIMATE, supra note 23, at 7 (“CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 
2355 would not have a substantial effect on the number of people who have health insurance 
coverage: compared to current law, there could be a small increase or decrease in the number 
of uninsured individuals.”). 
78. Id. at 5 (“CBO estimates that H.R. 2355 ultimately would reduce annual spending 
on employer-sponsored health insurance by $5 billion in 2006 dollars.”); see also id. at 1 
(“The increase in revenues would result largely from a reduction in the number of people who 
receive health insurance through employer-sponsored plans.  That would reduce the share of 
compensation that is tax-advantaged . . . and increase the share that is taxable . . . .”). 
79. Nor is there strong evidence that bypassing state law mandates and consumer pro-
tections would increase consumer choice, as several studies have shown that a few insurers 
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C.  Adequacy 
Those who are able to access and afford individual coverage may 
find themselves underinsured, particularly if they choose a less compre-
hensive policy.80  In addition, the HCCA would do little to reduce cost 
sharing such as deductibles and co-insurance, or administrative costs, all 
of which are higher with individual plans.81
D.  Eroding State Mandates 
As described above, the HCCA would permit health insurers to sell 
policies from the states with the fewest consumer protections, and to 
market and sell those policies to consumers in all other states.  As noted 
above, several states have begun to require equitable coverage of infer-
tility treatment.  Under the HCCA, an insurer from outside these states 
would be permitted to sell a policy of insurance to citizens of these states 
without these protections.  In this respect, the HCCA may do to the indi-
vidual insurance market what preemption under the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 197482 (ERISA) has done to self-funded 
group plans. 
It is well-known that state law mandates requiring coverage of cer-
tain conditions or treatments are unlikely to lead to uniform results be-
dominate the individual insurance market.  TURNBULL & KANE, supra note 15, at viii (em-
phasis omitted) (“A few carriers in each state dominate the individual health insurance market, 
a trend that has strengthened over time.”); THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., TRENDS 
AND INDICATORS IN THE CHANGING HEALTH CARE MARKETPLACE—SECTION 5: TRENDS IN 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE HEALTH CARE MARKETPLACE exhibit 5.12, available at 
http://www.kff.org/insurance/7031 (follow the “Section 5” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 22, 
2007); FUCHS, supra note 7, at 3 (citation omitted) (“While hundreds of insurance companies 
and health plans still sell in the individual market, only a few insurers account for 50 percent 
or more of the market in any state.”). 
80. “Underinsured” is generally understood as “[h]aving coverage that is inadequate, 
either because it includes high copayments and deductibles or because important costs are not 
covered.”  NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, FORUM FOR STATE HEALTH 
POLICY LEADERSHIP, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, ACCESS AND THE UNINSURED 13, 
available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/forum/faqaccess.pdf. 
81. See ALLIANCE FOR HEALTH REFORM, supra note 30, at 5; Gabel et al., Individual 
Insurance, supra note 8, at W173 (citation omitted) (“Fees paid to insurance agents often con-
stitute 10-15 percent of the premium dollar.  Whereas administrative expenses consume about 
25-40 percent of each premium dollar for individual insurance, they account for about 10 per-
cent of each premium dollar among large employer groups and 15-25 percent in the small-
group market.”); Mark V. Pauly & Allison M. Percy, Cost and Performance: A Comparison 
of the Individual and Group Health Insurance Markets, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 9, 18 
(2000) (stating that administrative loading on individual policies is one-third to one-half of 
premiums, in excess of the 5 to 30 percent for group policies). 
82. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 
88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000)). 
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cause of the structure of the preemption provisions of ERISA.83  ERISA, 
which regulates employer-sponsored welfare benefit plans including 
health benefit plans,84 “contains a broad preemption clause that pre-
empts state law insofar as it ‘relates to’ employee benefit plans, and 
ERISA provides the exclusive remedial scheme for ERISA benefits 
claims.”85  ERISA preemption has three parts.  First, the “preemption 
clause” provides that ERISA supersedes any and all state laws that relate 
to any employee benefit plan.86  Second, the “savings clause” exempts 
specific state laws regulating insurance, banking, and securities law from 
preemption.87  Third, under the “deemer clause,” self-funded88 employee 
welfare plans cannot be deemed insurance plans, and therefore will not 
be subject to specific state regulation.89
Because self-funded plans cannot be deemed insurance plans, state 
laws directed at insurance are not saved with respect to self-funded 
plans, and self-funded plans have not been considered subject to specific 
state regulation.90  In the context of state laws mandating coverage of a 
certain treatment or condition, it is well accepted that the structure of 
ERISA preemption leads to dramatically different results because such 
laws apply to insured plans, but not to self-funded plans.91  For example, 
state laws mandating coverage, such as the Massachusetts law mandat-
ing equitable coverage of infertility treatment, apply to most non-ERISA 
plans, such as individual policies, and to ERISA plans that are insured, 
but not to self-funded plans.  The HCCA could do to the individual mar-
ket what ERISA has done in the employer-based system—introduce an 
increasingly inequitable pattern of protection for people with individual 
83. See, e.g., Pendo, The Politics of Infertility, supra note 66, at 302; Colleen E. Medill, 
HIPAA and its Related Legislation: A New Role for ERISA in the Regulation of Private Health 
Care Plans?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 485, 491-92 (1998); John V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health In-
surance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 311, 352-61 (1997). 
84. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002. 
85. Pendo, The Politics of Infertility, supra note 66, at 309. 
86. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
87. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
88. “A self-funded plan is one in which the plan sponsor, rather than a health insurer, 
assumes the risk of covering the costs of the health care benefits provided by the terms of the 
plan.”  Colleen E. Medill et al., Coverage of Reproductive Technologies under Employer-
Sponsored Health Care Plans, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 523, 541 (2004). 
89. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
90. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 
U.S. 52, 61 (1990) (interpreting the deemer clause broadly to exempt self-funded, ERISA-
regulated plans from state regulation and state law claims). 
91. See Pendo, The Politics of Infertility, supra note 66, at 312 n.101 (discussing 
deemer clause exemptions of self-funded plans from other state laws, and the regulation of 
self-insured plans generally). 
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coverage, even within the same state. 
IV. THE POLITICS OF “CHOICE” 
The HCCA is an example of the current political approach to our 
health care crisis.  Although it is aimed at one small part of the overall 
health insurance market and although it may not pass,92 it is representa-
tive of the larger political approach to health care policy, focused on in-
dividual, market-based solutions to the health care crisis.  With respect 
to the individual market, the current administration is proposing tax-
credits for the purchase of individual policies,93 and supporters of the 
HCCA are also urging similar reforms to the individual market, includ-
ing an optional federal charter, allowing insurers to file plans with the 
federal government and then sell insurance in any state, and an interstate 
compact permitting multi-state association.94  In the insurance market 
generally, the administration is promoting the use of health savings ac-
counts in connection with a high-deductible policy, a combination re-
ferred to as a consumer-driven health plan.95
As Deborah Stone stated in her influential article, The Struggle for 
the Soul of Health Insurance, “The politics of American health insurance 
is a struggle over which vision of distributive justice should govern: the 
solidarity principle or the logic of actuarial fairness.”96  In Stone’s view, 
the solidarity principle recognizes that insurance is a form of mutual aid 
92. As reported by Hewitt Associates, “It is unclear if Congress will address [the 
HCCA] this year.  House leaders are reluctant to bring H.R. 2355 to the floor since it may not 
have enough votes for approval.”  HEWITT ASSOCS., HEWITT FEDERAL LEGISLATION QUICK 
GUIDE, PENDING LEGISLATION—HEALTH AND WELFARE PLANS 12 (2006), available at 
http://www.hewittassociates.com/_MetaBasicCMAssetCache_/Assets/Legislative%20Updates
/Quick%20Guide/hc_080806.pdf. 
93. See Making Health Care More Affordable and Accessible for All Americans, supra 
note 9. 
94. 2006 STATE LEGISLATORS’ GUIDE TO HEALTH INSURANCE SOLUTIONS, supra note 
62, at 35. 
95. See Pendo, Images of Health Insurance in Popular Film, supra note 6, at 291-93 
(discussing the shift toward consumer-directed health plans).  The Medicare Prescription Drug 
Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 amended the Internal Revenue Code to author-
ize the use of tax-favored health savings accounts in connection with a high-deductible health 
insurance policy.  Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1201, 117 Stat. 2066, 2469 (2003).  The combina-
tion is referred to as the consumer-driven health plan.  See Pendo, Images of Health Insurance 
in Popular Film, supra note 6, at 291-93. 
96. Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 287, 287 (1993) [hereinafter Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health In-
surance] (“Redistribution from the healthy to the sick is built into insurance.  Payouts are 
made on the basis of need (or loss incurred) not on the basis of contribution to the scheme. . . . 
[S]ubsidy from the vast majority of policyholders to a small minority is precisely what is sup-
posed to happen in insurance.”). 
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and collective responsibility, and that redistribution from the healthy to 
the sick is a necessary part of health insurance.97  Indeed, Stone de-
scribes broad-based, inclusive systems of insurance as a social good: 
To participate in a risk-pooling scheme is to agree to tax yourself not 
only for your own benefit should you incur a loss, but also for the 
benefit of others who might suffer from loss when you do not.  In-
surance thus creates what might be called a “moral opportunity,” the 
opportunity to cooperate with and help others.98
Despite the powerful influence of a conservative free-market ideology, 
“health insurance in the United States began as a social enterprise, and 
the concept of health insurance as a collective concern continues to 
resonate with the public.”99
In the context of the individual insurance market, state reforms 
which have attempted to make coverage more accessible and affordable 
(particularly to those who need it most), and to pool risk across a larger 
number of people, have exemplified the social solidarity point.100  For 
example, according to a survey of the literature, comprehensive state re-
forms to the individual market made coverage more expensive on aver-
age, although it did increase affordability and access to coverage for 
those who needed it most.101
In contrast, the principle of actuarial fairness, which Stone defines 
as “each person paying for his own risk,” rejects redistribution from the 
healthy to the sick.102  Instead, it seeks to divide and categorize people 
into small, discrete groups based on individually assessed risks.103  As 
such, it is highly individualistic, and aligned with the interests of private 
insurers in a competitive market: “Public policy has, for over a century, 
both permitted and exhorted insurers to compete in the market, on the 
theory that competition would breed innovation, efficiency, and ulti-
mately public welfare.”104
The HCCA and similar proposals follow the logic of actuarial fair-
97. Id. at 292.
98. Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6 
CONN. INS. L.J. 11, 14 (1999). 
99. Pendo, Images of Health Insurance in Popular Film, supra note 6, at 293 (citing 
Victor R. Fuchs, What’s Ahead for Health Insurance in the United States?, 346 NEW ENG. J.  
MED. 1822, 1822 (2002)). 
100. Thomas R. Oliver, Dynamics Without Change: The New Generation, 25 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 225, 226 (2000) (referring to the work of Len M. Nichols). 
101. FUCHS, supra note 7, at 12. 
102. See Crossley, supra note 73, at 77. 
103. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, supra note 96, at 290.
104. Id. at 313.
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ness by touting individual choice and freedom as the solution to a variety 
of problems with the individual market.105  People in need of insurance 
are seen as autonomous, individual consumers, free to make choices in 
the market.106  As Stone explains, 
In the competitive market, customers would shop around for the best 
deals to suit their budgets and their risk preferences.  Those who 
know (or think) they have a low risk for particular diseases would 
buy just the policies tailored to their own risk profiles.  Through self-
selection and pursuit of the almighty bargain, individuals would sort 
themselves into homogenous risk classes, albeit perhaps not as re-
fined as the classes achieved though underwriting.  The market could 
accomplish for insurers what government forbids them to do them-
selves.107
This is echoed in the words of Senator DeMint: 
The Health Care Choice Act will allow consumers to shop for health 
insurance the same way they do for other insurance products—
online, by mail, over the phone, or in consultation with an insurance 
agent in their hometown.  The Act empowers consumers by giving 
them the ability to purchase an affordable health insurance policy 
with a range of options.108
“‘[C]hoice’ also includes individual responsibility to make the right 
choices in terms of price and quality and the individual obligation to 
bear the consequences of such choices.”109  As scholars of neo-
liberalism in health care policy have noted, current health care policy is 
“increasingly requiring that individuals take personal responsibility for 
their own future and purchase goods and services which are designed to 
meet their personal requirements.”110  Moreover, failure to make the 
right choices is seen as a personal failure, rather than a failure of the sys-
tem to provide adequate options.111  Not surprisingly, scholars looking at 
105. I have written previously about this conception of “choice” in the context of con-
sumer-driven health plans.  See Pendo, Images of Health Insurance in Popular Film, supra 
note 6, at 291-93. 
106. Alan Peterson, Risk, Governance and the New Public Health, in FOUCAULT, 
HEALTH AND MEDICINE 189, 194 (Alan R. Petersen & Robin Bunton, eds., 1997) (citation 
omitted) (“[N]eo-liberal rationality emphasises [sic] the entrepreneurial individual, endowed 
with freedom and autonomy, and the capacity to properly care for him- or herself.”). 
107. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, supra note 96, at 314.
108. 151 CONG. REC. S5073 (daily ed. May 12, 2005) (statement of Sen. DeMint), 
available at http://www.senate.gov/~finance/hearings/testimony/2005test/040606jdtest.pdf. 
109. Pendo, Images of Health Insurance in Popular Film, supra note 6, at 293. 
110. Sarah Nettleton, Governing the Risky Self: How to Become Healthy, Wealthy and 
Wise, in FOUCAULT, HEALTH AND MEDICINE, supra note 106, at 208. 
111. This is a strain of neo-liberal theory that some scholars have applied to health care 
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reforms to the individual market have raised “fundamental questions 
about the role of competitive markets in promoting access to health 
care.”112  As one author has noted, “Are all the choices in benefits, cost-
sharing, premiums, and market entry and exit really that valuable, 
though, for most customers?  To argue that one can get a good price if 
one is ‘aggressive, informed, interested, and lucky’ is not comfort-
ing.”113
CONCLUSION 
The increasingly high cost of health care and the growing number 
of Americans without insurance are again making health care reform a 
prominent national issue.  Lack of insurance hurts the health and fi-
nances of people without insurance114 and people with insurance, who 
bear the burden of increased premiums.115  It also damages the national 
economy, costing $65 to $130 billion according to one estimate.116  Pub-
lic support for health care reform is also high.117  A recent survey 
policy.  See, e.g., Monica Greco, Psychosomatic Subjects and the ‘Duty to be Well’: Personal 
Agency Within Medical Rationality, 22 ECON. & SOC’Y 357, 361 (1993) (“If the regulation of 
life-style, the modification of risky behaviour and the transformation of unhealthy attitudes 
prove impossible though sheer strength of will, this constitutes, at least in part, a failure of the 
self to take care of itself—a form of irrationality, or simply a lack of skillfulness . . . .”); Peter-
son, supra note 106, at 194 (“[S]ince the mid-1970s, there has been a clear ideological shift 
away from the notion that the state should protect the health of individuals to the idea that in-
dividuals should take responsibility to protect themselves from risk.”). 
112. Robert B. Hackey, The Politics of Reform, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 211, 
211 (2000). 
113. Oliver, supra note 100, at 227-28. 
114. For an overview of the uninsured and access to care, see Pendo, Images of Health 
Insurance in Popular Film, supra note 6, at 280-82. 
115. See, e.g., FAMILIES USA, PAYING A PREMIUM: THE ADDED COST OF CARE FOR 
THE UNINSURED 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/Paying_a_Premium_rev_July_13731e.pdf (“In 2005, 
premium costs for family health insurance coverage provided by private employers will in-
clude an extra $922 in premiums due to the cost of care for the uninsured; premiums for indi-
vidual coverage will cost an extra $341.”). 
116. Paul Fronstin & Ray Werntz, The “Business Case” for Investing in Employee 
Health: A Review of the Literature and Employer Self-Assessments, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., 
Mar. 2004, at 7, 8, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/0304ib.pdf. 
117. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE PUBLIC, MANAGED CARE, AND 
CONSUMER PROTECTIONS, KAISER PUBLIC OPINION UPDATE 2 (2001), available at 
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/health_cast/uploaded_files/PublicOpinionUpdate1.pdf (stating 
that “at least three out of four Americans support[] such laws over time”); Attitudes Toward 
the United States’ Health Care System: Long-Term Trends, HEALTH CARE NEWS, Aug. 21, 
2002, at 1, 1-5 available at 
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/newsletters/healthnews/HI_HealthCareNews2002Vol2
_Iss17.pdf (discussing a 2002 poll, which showed that the prior-documented gaps between the 
views of the public, physicians, employers, hospital managers, and health plan managers have 
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showed that most people felt that our health care system needs either 
“fundamental change” or “complete rebuilding,” and that expanding 
coverage and controlling costs should be top priorities for federal ac-
tion.118  Despite the claims of its proponents, the HCCA is unlikely to 
solve the problems of affordability and access that it claims to address, 
and it may in fact exacerbate them. 
On a political level, the continued focus on individual “choice” and 
market-based solutions as a response to our deepening health care crisis 
is counterproductive.  Individualistic, market-based solutions like the 
HCCA will not address systemic issues such as the increasingly high 
cost of health care or the growing crisis of un- and under-insurance.  In-
stead, these proposed solutions may disproportionately disadvantage 
those in less-than-perfect health by further fragmenting the market. 
 
narrowed, with the level of support for “radical change” similar across these groups); see also 
Humphrey Taylor, Attitudes to Government Regulation Vary Greatly for Different Industries, 
Harris Poll No. 19 (Apr. 2, 2003), 
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=367 (discussing a 2003 poll, in 
which two of the top four industries most often characterized as needing more regulation were 
the managed care industry and the health insurance industry, ranking just in front of the phar-
maceutical and oil industries). 
118. CATHY SCHOEN ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, PUBLIC VIEWS ON 
SHAPING THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. HEALTH SYSTEM 3, 11 (2006), available at 
http://www.cmwf.org/usr_doc/Schoen_publicviewsfuturehltsystem_948.pdf. 
